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Franklin Co. Case No. 
CR-2012-28 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Has See failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed, upon his guilty plea to 
failure to register as a sex offender, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence? 
See Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
See, a registered sex offender in the State of Indiana, left Indiana without 
changing his registered address and, over a period of approximately one year, moved 
between Colorado, California, Arizona, Utah, and Idaho, "failing to register with each 
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move." (PSI, pp.2-3.) When officers contacted See in Preston, Idaho in December 
2011, they advised him that he was required to register within two days. (PSI, p.2.) 
See failed to register and, in January 2012, officers located See at a residence in 
Preston and were informed that See had been living at the Preston residence "since 
before Thanksgiving." (PSI, p.2.) 
The state charged See with failure to register as a sex offender. (R., pp.44-45.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, See pied guilty and the state agreed to recommend a 
unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.55-57, 64-65.) At 
sentencing, See's counsel requested that the district court follow the state's 
recommendation. (Tr., p.8, Ls.3-9; p.10, Ls.12-14; p.11, Ls.4-6, 10-14.) Consistent with 
the plea agreement and the recommendations of both parties, the district court imposed 
a unified sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.68-70.) See filed a notice 
of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.74-76.) He also filed a timely 
Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. (R., p.72. 1) 
See asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his purported remorse and 
acceptance of responsibility, because he "had no other new charges despite 
investigations," and because the district court "first noted an LSI score of 32 in support 
1 According to the updated register of actions, a hearing on See's Rule 35 motion was 
held on June 28, 2012, and the district court entered a Minute Entry and Order, 
presumably denying the motion, on the same date. (See Franklin County case number 
CR-2012-28 at https://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseNumberSearch.do.) 
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of the sentence, but then agreed that the score did not match up with the PSI writer's 
notation that Mr. See was a medium risk to offend." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6 (citations 
omitted).) There are two reasons why See's argument fails. First, See requested the 
sentence he received and is therefore precluded by the invited error doctrine from 
challenging the sentence on appeal. Second, even if this Court reviews the merits of 
See's claims, he has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a 
ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was 
error. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who "caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court" to take a particular action from "later 
challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237,240, 985 P.2d 117, 
120 (1999). This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during 
trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990). 
As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to recommend a unified 
sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.55-57.) At sentencing, See's 
counsel requested that the district court follow the plea agreement, stating: "[T]he state 
had agreed to impose - recommend a unified three, one being fixed and two being 
indeterminate. Your Honor, that is going to be my recommendation as well, in spite of 
the fact that the presentence investigator recommends a retained jurisdiction program" 
(Tr., p.8, Ls.3-9); "I believe that the plea agreement as it is written is an appropriate 
sentence" (Tr., p.10, Ls.12-14); and, "I would ask the court to follow the terms and 
conditions of the plea agreement" (Tr., p.11, Ls.4-6). Consistent with the plea 
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agreement and the recommendations of both parties, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of three years, with one year fixed. (R., pp.68-70.) Because See received the 
very sentence he requested, he cannot claim on appeal that it is excessive or that the 
district court abused its discretion by declining to reduce his sentence. Therefore, See's 
claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error. 
Even if this Court considers the merits of See's claim, he has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion. The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 
Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is 
presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of 
confinement. !st (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where 
a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating 
that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 
615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this 
burden the appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable 
view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, 
however, if it appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society 
or any of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. !st 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district considered See's ongoing 
disregard for the law and the risk he presents to the community. See's criminal record 
includes at least three felony convictions. (PSI, pp.3-4.) He was convicted (in Indiana) 
of felony sexual battery in 2005, at the age of 40, after he had sexual intercourse with a 
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12-year-old child. (PSI, pp.2-4, 20.2) He was placed on probation, but violated his 
probation and was "sent to prison." (PSI, p.4.) After being released from prison, See 
signed a sex offender registration form on May 14, 2010, in which he acknowledged that 
he was required to register within three days of changing residence, at least once every 
seven days if homeless or staying at a temporary residence, and within three days of 
arriving in any county in which he held employment. (PSI, p.13.) According to See, he 
left Indiana in April 2011, after which he moved between Colorado, California, Arizona, 
Utah, and Idaho. (PSI, pp.2-3.) Although he obtained an Arizona identification card, he 
failed to register "with each move." (PSI, p.2.) He began working in Idaho in November 
2011 and lived at an apartment in Preston, Idaho "since before Thanksgiving." (PSI, 
pp.2, 8.) See failed to register as a sex offender in Idaho and, in December 2011, his 
name was run through NCIC during a traffic stop. (PSI, p.2.) At that time, officers 
advised See that he was required to register within two days. (PSI, p.2.) See again 
failed to register. (PSI, p.2.) A detective from the State of Indiana subsequently 
contacted the Franklin County Sheriff's Office and notified Idaho authorities that See 
was "non-compliant, as he was ... not living at his registered address." (PSI, p.2.) 
Officers arrested See at his Preston residence in January 2012, at which time See 
claimed that he was not required to register unless he was "establishing residency." 
(PSI, p.2.) Although he eventually admitted, during his presentence interview, that he 
had been living at the residence in Preston for several months, See continued to justify 
his failure to register by claiming that he "was told if he did not stay for longer than three 
2 Pages attached to the PSI have been numbered consecutively, beginning at page 12. 
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days, he would not have to register. He stated it was his plan to move on, and not stay 
in Idaho." (PSI, pp.3, 6.) 
At sentencing, the state argued: 
I guess the comment I would make, Your Honor, is that this was an 
individual that had left the jurisdiction that he was required to register in. 
He was, frankly, on the run. Nobody knew where he was from his 
jurisdiction. The only way they found him was that he ... happened to be 
in [a] vehicle that was pulled over. He was run through the NCIC criminal 
database by the investigating officer at that time. 
The investigating officer back in his jurisdiction then did a 
nationwide search and found that he'd been run through NCIC here in 
Preston, Idaho. He recontacted that officer and said see if you can find 
him. Because we're a small community, small departments, we recognize 
people. That particular deputy remembered seeing him, running him 
through the check, and went and found the residence where he was living 
at the time and where he'd been for over a month. 
Your Honor, we have these laws in place for a reason, for the 
protection of society. I think that's the overarching concern here from the 
state's perspective, is to ensure that individuals that have either been 
found guilty or who have pied guilty to a sex related crime register 
appropriately for the requisite period of time. Mr. See did not do that. This 
was a case that crossed state lines so it raises even additional awareness 
and concern for the state. 
(Tr., p.11, L.17 - p.12, L.20.) Likewise, the district court stated, "This court views the 
sex offender requirements associated with registration of those individuals who are 
convicted sex offenders to be a statute that deals specifically with the issue of protection 
of society. That is one means whereby we as a society have the ability to monitor and 
keep track of those individuals who have been convicted of sex related offenses" (Tr., 
p.14, Ls.17-24), and, "So, the protection of society plays a very real role in what I do in 
this particular matter" (Tr., p.16, Ls.3-4). The sentence imposed is reasonable in light of 
See's failure to register in any jurisdiction or to notify authorities of his whereabouts for 
over eight months. 
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See claims that the district court abused its discretion when it "first noted an LSI 
score of 32 in support of the sentence, but then agreed that the score did not match up 
with the PSI writer's notation that Mr. See was a medium risk to offend, and did not 
inquire further to determine if the LSI score was reported in error, or if the reporting of 
the medium range was incorrect." (Appellant's brief, p.6 (citations omitted).) The 
presentence investigator wrote, "According to the LSI-R, the defendant scored 32 out of 
54. This places him in the medium range for risk of reoffending. (0-15 Low Risk, 16-30 
Moderate Risk, 31-54 High Risk)." (PSI, p.10 (parentheses original).) At sentencing, 
See's counsel, Mr. Marler, did not request a correction to the PSI, but merely noted that 





Well, it appears to be probably a typographical error, 
because the ranges are - that places him at the low 
end of the high range, but it is within the high range. I 
appreciate your clarification of that point. I do note 
that the presentence investigator does say medium 
range for reoffending. If that is their conclusion, I 
disagree with that conclusion. 
The other explanation, the 32 score may be in error 
as well. 
And that is a possibility. Thank you for those 
clarifications with respect to that issue. Based upon 
that clarification, the court would still state that without 
regard to that discrepancy, and I recognize that that 
can be viewed in both the way I addressed it or it 
could be viewed the way Mr. Marler indicates, I still 
view, based on the totality of the facts and 
circumstances in this case, that protection of society 
does warrant the prison sentence the court has 
imposed in this matter. 
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(Tr., p.18, L.24- p.19, L.18.) Because the district court felt that the sentence imposed 
was necessary irrespective of See's LSI score, it did not abuse its discretion by 
imposing the sentence that was requested by both parties. 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and imposed a 
reasonable sentence. The sentence imposed is appropriate in light of See's disregard 
for the law and his sex offender registration requirements and the risk he presents to 
society. Given any reasonable view of the facts, See has failed to establish an abuse of 
sentencing discretion. 
See next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion. If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the 
motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 
838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, See must "show that the sentence is excessive 
in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in 
support of the Rule 35 motion." l_g_,_ See has failed to satisfy his burden. 
As acknowledged by See, he "did not submit any new information or 
documentation in support of his Rule 35 motion." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8; R., p.72.) 
On appeal, See merely argues that his sentence was excessive as originally imposed 
and, therefore, the district court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to his Rule 
35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) The state submits that by failing to establish his 
sentence was excessive as imposed, See has also failed to establish that the district 
court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion. 
8 
Conclusion 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm See's conviction and sentence 
and the district court's order denying See's Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 2013. 
VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
Paralegal 
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